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IS it a mere accidental coincidence that Goethe
and Schopenhauer
in some of their writings should both express themselves more
or less adversely towards mathematics and mathematical methods
in the study of natural phenomena?
The fact that Schopenhauer in 1813, when twenty-five years
of age, went to Weimar and became acquainted with Goethe,
under whose powerful influence he wrote a memoir Ueber Sehen
iind die Farben (published in 1816), would warrant the conclusion
that their opinions on various scientific topics were a result of
rather penetrating mutual discussions.
It is a proof for the universality of their intellects that they
dared to enter into a discussion on the merits of a science of which
both had only a very rudimentary knowledge. There is a kernel
of truth in some of their statements, while others are dilettantic
and still others erroneous or at least warped.
As is well known, Goethe was deeply interested in problems of
natural philosophy during his later life, and his fundamental dis-
coveries justly entitle him to be classed as a pioneer of Darwinism.
That Goethe was fully aware of his handicap in attacking certain
scientific problems appears from the following extract from "Mathe-
matics and its Abuse"^ : "Considering my inclinations and con-
ditions I had to appropriate to myself very early the right to in-
vestigate, to conceive nature in her simplest, most hidden origins
as well as in her most revealed, most conspicuous creations also
without the aid of mathematics. . . .1 was accused of being an op-
ponent, an enemy of mathematics in general, although nobody can
appreciate it more highly than I, as it accomplishes exactly those
things which I was prevented from realizing."
^ Natunvisscnschaftlichc Schriftcn, 2d part, Vol. II, p. 78, Weimar, 1893.
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Further on, however, when the thought turns again upon
mathematics and mathematicians, we find this curious statement :-
"It is a wrong conception to think that a phenomenon could be
explained by calculus or words" and "mathematicians are like
Frenchmen ; if one speaks to them they translate it into their own
language, and then it will be very soon something entirely different."
On page 138 when writing about natural science in general, Goethe
expresses his idea of the ntathematician as he ought to be in the
following striking manner: "The mathematician is perfect only in
so far as he is a perfect man, as he feels the beauty of truth ; only
then does he become thorough, penetrating, pure, clear, graceful
and even elegant. All this is necessary to become like Lagrange."
What particular individual he had in mind when he wrote:
"There are pedants who are at the same time thieves, and these
are by far the worst," is not revealed. It is a partial consolation
for the modern scientists, however, to find that Goethe already had
to contend with such types.
It is extremely interesting that Goethe should quote d'Alembert
as an authority on mathematics. We see here the influence of the
encyclopedists upon European thought of that great period. There
probably never lived a more brilliant and influential circle of phi-
losophers and scientists that shaped the destiny of nations. Diderot
and d'Alembert as co-editors of the great Encyclopedie ou dic-
tiotinaire raisonnc des sciences, des arts et des metiers, Helvetius
in his famous work De Vesprit, Voltaire by his piercing satire and
Rousseau by his educational philosophy. La Mettrie as the author
of L'homme machine^ and Holbach in his Systcme de la nature,
were all teaching that a new time had arrived.
With the exception of Kant, the great intellectual giant at
Konigsberg, Germany had during that whole period no philosophers
and scientists of her own to boast of. From 1741 to 1766 it was
the Swiss Euler and from 1766»to 1787 Lagrange, who gave lustre
to the Academy at Berlin. Others, like the poet-scientist Haller, as
appears from the dedication* of L'honune machine, were intellectu-
ally not even a match with such men as La Mettrie. Towards the
end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century
Gauss began his epoch-making discoveries and thereby placed Ger-
''Loc. cit. p. 98.
' English translation by Gertrude C. Bussey, published by the Open Court
Publishing Co.
^This is not included in the above-mentioned English edition, but may be
found in The Open Court of July, 1913, p. 427.
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many in mathematics on a level with France, where men like
d'Alembert, Lagrange, Monge, Laplace, Legendre and Fourier had
won international reputation.
Gauss, however, never published anything for a general scien-
tific public on his early meditations on the nature of mathematical
reasoning and in particular on what we call now non-Euclidean
geometry, so that naturally Goethe, even in his old age, was not
able to learn anything about the new views in the science of space.
The passage of d'Alembert to which Goethe refers may be
found in the famous Discours prcliminaire de I'encyclopcdie:^
"As regards mathematical sciences, which constitute the second
of the limits of which we have spoken, their nature and their num-
ber must not startle us. What are most of the axioms of which
geometry is so proud, if not the expression of the same simple
idea by two different signs or words? The man who says that
tzvo times tzvo is four, does he know more than somebody that
contents himself by saying tzvo times tzvo is tzvo times tzvo ? The
ideas of the whole, the part, of greater and less, properly speaking,
are they not the same simple and individual idea ; since one cannot
have one of them without the others presenting themselves all at
the same time? As some philosophers have observed we owe
many errors to the abuse of words ; it is perhaps to the same abuse
that we owe the axioms."
This is as far as Goethe quotes, so that without the rest of
d'Alembert's argument one might look upon the latter as a rather
one-sided critic. From d'Alembert's achievements as a mathemati-
cian and those portions of his Discours that treat of the various
divisions of mathematics it is plain what great intrinsic value he
placed upon mathematics and the mathematical spirit in scientific
investigations in general. When he speaks of the abuse of words
he simply states those truths which later his famous compatriot
Poincare, on various occasions, advanced against some claims of
the modern logisticians.
Concerning logic d'Alembert has the following to say:'' "It is
the reduction to an art of the manner in which knowledge is gained
and in which we conmmunicate reciprocally our own thoughts to
each other. It teaches to arrange ideas in the most natural order
and to link them by the most direct chain of thoughts, to resolve
those that contain too large a number of simpler ideas, to look at
them from all sides, in order to present them to others in a form
'CEuvres de D'Alembert, Vol. I, pp. 30-32, Paris 1821.
° Loc. cit, pp. 33-34.
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in which they can be easily grasped. It is in this that this science
of reasoning consists and which is justly considered as the key to
all our knowledge. One must not believe, however, that it occupies
the first place in the realm of invention. The art of reasoning is
a gift presented by nature of her own accord to good intellects
(bons esprits) ; and it may be said that the books which treat of
logic are hardly of any use except to those who can get along
without them.^ Those that are familiar with Poincare's style might
easily mistake the last humerous remark as one of his famous
sallies.
In this connection it is interesting to see what a modern writer,
Mr. H. C. Brown, thinks about "the problem of method in mathe-
matics and philosophy." He writes :'^ "The fact which seems to have
been neglected by mathematicians is that the proof of consistency,
by demanding an exhibition of something already known, puts a
check on the "free creation" theory of mathematical systems and
places them logically on a level with the concepts of all other sci-
ences which all aim at hypothetico-deductive procedure.—A merely
deductive mathematics would be of as little value as a 'freely
created' philosophy.—All sciences must turn upon some existence,
and a science wliich turns to a merely imagined world is dream-
play."
...
D'Alembert returns with great detail to a discussion of the
principles of the various branches of human knowledge and of
scientific methods in his Essai sur Ics clcmens de philosophie.^
For the mathematicians and philosophers that make a study of the
foundations of science, chapters fourteen to twenty are of par-
ticular interest. On pp. 278-280. for instance, we find a very clever
discussion of the difficulties that arise in connection with the
parallel-axiom. The "Elements" were published in 1759, at a tims
when hardly anybody thought of a critical examination of Euclid's
Elements. ^°
Schopenhauer's remarks on mathematical questions were on
the whole less personal than Goethe's. From his principal work Die
iVelt als Wille und Vorstellung ^'^ whose first volume appeared in
1819 (a second edition increased by a second volume did not appear
till 1844) we translate the following lines on Euclid's method:
" See a recent article by J. Charpentier : "Diderot et la science de son
temps," in La Revue du Mots, Vol. 8, pp. 537-552 (Nov. 1913).
" Essays Philosophical and Psychological, p. 427.
'Loc.'cit., pp. 115-348.
^'' La geometria del coiiipasso by Mascheroni appeared in 1797 in Pavia.
" IVerke, Vol. I, p. 75 (Leipsic, F. A. Brockhaus, 1901).
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"It is true in mathematics, according to Euclid's treatment,
that the axioms are the only undemonstrable premises, and all
demonstrations are successively subordinated to them. This treat-
ment, however, is not essential, and, indeed, every theorem begins
with a new construction in space which in itself is independent
of the preceding ones and which in reality can be recognized also
in entire independence of them, in itself, by pure intuition of space,
in which in reality also the most complicated construction is im-
mediately as evident as the axiom itself."
This remarkable statement interpreted by an inventive geo-
metrician or intuitionist of the present day would of course not
stand serious criticism. How, for instance, should Steiner's famous
solution of Malfatti's problem to construct three circles each tan-
gent to the other two and to two sides of the triangle, or the
Steinerian problem of closure in connection with cubics and quar-
tics be obvious even to the most acute geometrician? From a
more general standpoint the only reasonable meaning which may
be placed on Schopenhauer's idea is that an intrinsic geometric
truth is independent of any particular set of axioms.
Schopenhauer denies the creative power of logistic geometry
when he says "that intuition is the first source of evidence and
that the immediate and intermediate relations derived from it are
the only absolute truth, furthermore that the shortest path to truth
is always the surest and that the transmission through concepts is
subject to many illusions. .. .We demand the reduction of every
logical proof to one of an intuitional nature ; Euclid's mathematics,
however, makes great efiforts to cast off wantonly its intuitional
evidence everywhere near at hand, in order to substitute in place
of it a logical proof. We must find that this is as if somebody
would cut his legs off in order to go on crutches. .. .That what
Euclid proves is true we have to acknowledge through the principle
of contradiction ; but we do not learn the reason why it is true.
We experience therefore almost the same unpleasant sensation
that is caused by a sleight-of-hand performance, and, indeed, most
of Euclid's proofs singularly resemble such tricks. The truth
almost always appears through the back door, since it results
by accident from some minor condition. An apagogical proof often
closes one door after another and leaves open only one through which
to pass. xA.ccording to our opinion, therefore. Euclid's method in
mathematics appears as a very brilliant perversity (Verkehrtheit)."
Schopenhauer maintains that the reason for the Euclidean
system could be traced back to the prevailing philosophic system
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of that time. The Eleatics were the first to discover the difference,
and frequently the contradiction, between the things observed and
the same things thought of. The sophists and skeptics drew atten-
tion to ilkisions, i. e., to the deception of the senses. It was recog-
nized that intuition through the senses was not always reliable.
For this reason they came to the conclusion that only logical rea-
soning could establish truth. Plato and Pyrrhon, on the other
hand, showed by examples how definitions and conclusions in
agreement with the laws of logic were likewise apt to mislead
and to produce sophisms which were much more difficult to solve
than deceptions of the senses. Rationalism in opposition to em-
piricism however became the dominant philosophy, and, according
to Schopenhauer, it is under its influence that Euclid wrote his
"Elements," in which he felt compelled to regard only the axioms
as based upon intuitional evidence (<f)aLv6fji€vov) while the remainder
follows from conclusions (vooi'/xevov). In a highly refined form the
controversy which separated the Greeks is still present. As Carus^-
says: "In philosophy we have the old contrast between the empiri-
cist and transcendentalist." Concerning the origin or the starting-
point of mathematical system the same author remarks "that the
data of mathematics are not without their premises ; they are not,
as the Germans say, voraussetzungslos, and though mathematics is
built up from nothing, the mathematician does not start with noth-
ing. He uses mental implements and it is they that give character
to his science."^^
Schopenhauer's conception of the domain that should be char-
acteristic of mathematics is that the existence of a mathematical
truth should be equivalent with the reason for it. It would of
course be a tremendous advantage if this equivalence could always
be established in the most simple manner by pure intuition, even
when conceived in a higher sense. This method followed by the
inventive mathematician as conceived by Poincare is of a superior
type and has presumably led to the greatest mathematical discov-
eries. The process of coordination with other branches and of
rigorous analysis of the elements that constitute the truth is sub-
sequently a problem of the mathematical logician. In a noted
lecture^* on humanistic education and exact science Poincare said
:
" The Foundations of Mathematics, a Contribution to the Philosophy of
Geometry, p. 36. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1908.
" See also the valuable and clearly written article "De la methode dans les
sciences" by E. Picard in De la science, pp. 1-30, Paris, 1909.
" Delivered at the annual session of the Verein der Freunde des humanis-
tischen Gymnasiums in Vienna, May 22, 1912.
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"Before he [the mathematician] demonstrates he must invent.
But nobody has ever invented anything by pure deduction. Pure
logic cannot create anything ; there is only one way to discovery,
namely induction ; for the mathematician as well as for the phys-
icist. Induction, however, presupposes the art of divination and
the ability to select ; we must be satisfied with intuition and not
wait for certitude. To do this, however, requires a refined intellect
(esprit de finesse). For this reason there are two kinds of mathe-
maticians. There are some that possess the mathematical spirit
only ; they may be valuable laborers who pursue successfully the
paths laid out for them. We need people of this kind, we need
many of them. But beside these more common mathematicians
there are some that possess the esprit de finesse, they are the truly
creative intellects."
It is true that the famous example for the evidence of the
Pythagorean theorem shows the limited mathematical knowledge of
Schopenhauer, or else he would have known that "evident" proofs
of the general theorem are numerous. That Schopenhauer, in spite
of some valuable critical remarks on mathematical methods did not
understand the true meaning of Euclid's method and much less the
raison d'etre of non-Euclidean geometry^'^ appears from the follow-
ing characteristic passage:
"In the famous controversy over the theory of parallel lines
and in the perennial attempts to prove the Uth axiom, the Euclidean
method of demonstration has born from its own fold its most ap-
propriate parody and caricature .... This scruple of consciousness
reminds me of Schiller's question of law
:
'Jahre lang schon bedien' ich mich meiner Nase zum Riechen;
Hab ich denn wirklich an sie auch ein erweisliches Recht?'
[Years upon years I've been using my nose for the purpose of smelling.
Now I must question myself: Have I a right to its use?]i6
"I am surprised that the eighth axiom: 'Figures that can be
made coincident are equal.' should not be attacked. For, to coincide
is either a mere tautology or else something of an entirely empirical
^° Lobatschevsky's epoch-making work on parallels appeared between 1829
and 1840. (English translation by George Bruce Halsted under the title Geo-
metrical Researches on the Theory of Parallels). The Science Absolute of
Space by Bolyai, equally important, was published in 1826 (English transla-
tion by Dr. Halsted). Die gcometrischen Constructioncn, ausgefiihrt mittels
der geraden Linie und eines festen Kreises, by Steiner, appeared in 1833.
" See Carus, Goethe and Schiller's Xenions.
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character which does not belong to pure intuition. It presupposes
movement of figures. In space, however, only matter is movable."
In Parerga und Paralipomena}'^ Schopenhauer, discussing op-
tical questions, strikes a personal note when he writes : "On the
polarization of light the Frenchmen have nothing but nonsensical
theories on undulations and homogeneous light, besides computa-
tions which are not based upon anything. They are constantly in a
haste to measure and to calculate ; they consider this as the main
thing, and their slogan is le calcul! le calcul! But I say, Oil le calctil
commence, rintelUgence des phcnouicnes cesse: he who has only
numbers in his head cannot find the trace of the connective cause."
Here again we see that Schopenhauer, like Goethe, did not
appreciate at all what the French mathematical physicists had done.
But how, without hardly any mathematical knowledge, could they
expect to understand the Frenchmen? Nothing could show better
than the foregoing statement the scientific limitations of the other-
wise towering intellect of Schopenhauer. Of the real difficulties
that lie at the foundation of mathematics neither Goethe nor
Schopenhauer had a true conception. They were not able to antici-
pate even a possibility of the tremendous progress that has since
been made and had been made during Schopenhauer's lifetime.
But considered from a modern standpoint their often ill-tem-
pered remarks appear as interesting flash-lights of a great historic
period.
"Loc. cit. Vol. 11, p. 128.
